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Abstract 
 
Governance refers to the processes and structure used to direct and manage an 
organizations operations and activities. It defines the division of power, and 
establishes the mechanisms to achieve accountability between owners, managers 
and stakeholders, and the entity that is the organization. Governance helps the 
organization focus on the activities which contribute most to their overall 
objectives and to utilize their resources effectively and ensure they are managed 
in the best interests of their principal stakeholders. This paper examines the 
evolution of governance together with some of the issues associated with the 
practice of governance and stakeholder management. The paper also explores 
some of the key themes associated ethics within the governance model. 
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Introduction 
As many academics have noted countless business organizations are run on the 
basis of ideology more than anything else (Hawley & White 1996, McManus, 2006,).  
An ideology is a set of beliefs or assumptions about the proper state of things, 
particularly with respect to the moral order and political arrangements which serve 
to shape one's position on governance issues (Hornum & Stavish, 1978). The 
important thing to note in this concept is that the conception of morality provides 
the means to manage individuals from within by creating a criterion of propriety 
within each and every individual. From a governance perspective this is important 
because it provides the basis for the ethical management of individuals, and the 
managing of conflict with the minimum use of power or direct action (Foucault, 
1988). It is important to recognise at this point that organisations and stakeholders 
have expectations which may not be synergistic in that stakeholders do not always 
share the same ideology. Ideological conflict, between the power seekers and 
stakeholders, is somewhat typical within organizations, even governments. 
It could be argued that there is no dominant ideology, especially in an organization 
as complex as government.  There are instead temporary alliances formed around 
issues and opportunities. Conflicting ideologies usually influence managers by 
creating goal ambiguity (McManus, 2006).   An ideology also refers to a belief in 
something as true that is actually false, or at the base of it, containing a 
falsehood.  Ideologies survive by putting a positive spin on something negative.  
According to Durkheim ideologies always rest on a lie (Durkheim, in Giddens, 
1972).  Ideologies are the opposite of the word “institution” because anything that 
reaches the level of social institution must rest on a kernel of truth. From a 
governance perspective all organisations are social institutions with hierarchies and 
power bases where business is managed by owners and managers who in theory are 
responsible for their own actions and the actions of their subordinates (McManus, 
2004).  
 
Before going on to examine some of the points raised above I would like to briefly 
discuss the emergence of governance starting with the work of Berle and Means 
(1932). 
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The Evolution of Governance  
The evaluation of governance can be traced back to the work of Berle and Means 
(1932). Berle and Means suggested that: the rise of the modern corporation has 
brought a concentration of economic power which can compete on equal terms 
with the modern state… Where its own interests are concerned, it even attempts to 
dominate the state. The future may see the economic organism, now typified by 
the corporation, not only on an equal plane with the state, but possibly even 
superseding it as the dominant form of social organization. Berle and Means 
concern about the separation of ownership from control was not only about 
managers' lack of accountability to investors. It was also a concern about managers' 
lack of accountability to society in general. In the 1960s, a group of economists 
began to devise tests based on the idea that the motives of corporate decision 
makers would be reflected in firm performance, researchers such as Monsen (1968) 
and Palmer (1973), classified firms as either owner or management controlled, and 
then compared the profit rates of the firms in each group. According to Lintner a 
second major component of the managerialist thesis was that managerial autonomy 
increased as a result of increases in retained earnings, which freed managers from 
dependence on banks and other financial institutions for capital and give them the 
power to control and influence external events thus ushering in a dangerous era of 
concentrated economic power. Williamson (1964), a leading contemporary 
economist, used Herbert Simon's (1957), bounded rationality assumption to develop 
a model in which managerial goals, of which profit maximization was just one, 
could vary across conditions. In his subsequent work, Williamson (1975) drew in 
part on the historical analyses of Alfred Chandler (1962) to show the importance of 
managerial decision making. In the mid 1970’s Jensen and Meckling begin by 
distancing themselves from some key managerialist claims, in particular the 
rejection of the profit maximization assumption. They acknowledge that managers 
might have motives that differ from those of owners. The issue, for Jenson and 
Meeking was one in which both managers and owners interests corresponded with 
one another. Clearly this involved some effective monitoring mechanism. One 
mechanism suggested Jensen and Meckling (1976) was the provision of equity to 
management. When managers own stock in the firm, they share interests in its 
performance with the remaining equity holders. Another important mechanism is to 
provide direct monitoring through the appointment of an expert board of directors, 
who are constrained to operate in the shareholders interest because of their need 
to maintain their reputations. A third monitor is the market, both in terms of its 
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effect on the firm's stock price and the related market for corporate control. This 
last approach is potentially the most threatening, since it raises the possibility that 
managers (that is directors or officers of the firm) could be ousted or dismissed by 
the board or its shareholders. However, Mace (1971), in his classic work on boards, 
suggested that the “powers” of control usually rest with the president- not with 
the board... It is the president who, like the family owner-managers in the small 
corporation, determines in large part what the board of directors does and does 
not do. Fredrickson, Hambrick, and Baumrin (1987) presented a model of factors 
that might account for the dismissal of CEO (or director) or senior officers of the 
firm, several of which involved board structure and behaviour.  According to 
Finkelstein & Hambrick, (1996) the increased risk of dismissal early in a CEO tenure 
is due to the fact that boards will be risk adverse and more vigilant in their early 
evaluation of the CEO as the costs of making a bad CEO selection decision are likely 
lower when the poor decision is discovered and remedied quickly. The growing 
emphasis on risk, governance and board issues among business academics during 
the 1980s2 and early 1990s reflected the widely held belief amongst stakeholders 
(and the public at large) that managerial ethics and discretion had seriously 
declined over the previous two decades (Shen and Cannella, 2002). The 
consequence of which have been played out in the media in many a corporate 
scandal (including Enron, World Com, Vivendi, Parmalat and many others vividly 
show the problem). New reforms such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) introduced 
in the aftermath of Enron and the Cadbury (1992) and Turnbull (1999) reports in 
the UK have done little to tend the tide of governance scandals on both sides of 
the Atlantic. It could be argued that regardless of the governance practices applied 
the responsibilities carried out by the board depend mainly on deficient legal 
regulations, dispersion of ownership, directors’ attitudes, directors’ willingness to 
take responsibilities, directors’ attention to duty, directors’ ability to assess the 
firm’s environment, organisation, personnel and political affairs as well as the 
resulting financial accounting practices and directors’ remunerations. The lower 
than expected efficiency of the governance function is due to the deficiencies in 
some or all of the stated factors (MacAvoy and Millstein, 2003). 
 
 
 
                                                     
2 For example, in the early 1980s the UK, Prudential Assurance Company fought an expensive legal action against some 
directors who had allegedly committed breaches of duties. Although institutional investors clearly have a general 
interest in well run companies and clean markets the economic reality is that it is not in their interest to spend much 
time on getting involved in corporate governance. 
 6
Progressive Governance 
As previously stated the governance function has been divided into two 
organisational functions: governance, making mostly decisions for protecting 
owners’ interests; and management, coordinating business activities and managing 
stakeholder relationships in a most efficient way with the purpose to attain 
objectives and goals set by governance. Conceptions of governance and stakeholder 
involvement are varied (Floyd & McManus, 2004) there is a multiplicity of 
interpretations of governance and the role stakeholders should play (Turnbull, 
1997). According to MacAvoy and Millstein (2003), historically, throughout its 
development, a firm has had one basic objective, that is to carry out business 
activities with a view toward enhancing corporate profit and shareholders gain. 
The recent development is the view that other stakeholders should also participate 
in governance and that they should make major strategic decisions together with 
owners as well as supervise managerial decisions and participate in decisions on 
profit sharing. The progressive proposals for governance offered by MacAvoy and 
Millstein included: 
• Complete separation of Chair and CEO3 
• Sarbanes-Oxley certification of financial statements extended to the board 
• Board takes responsibility for strategy, risk management and financial 
reporting 
• Board must assure itself of the integrity of management 
• Board to appoint internal auditors, and also own consultants, advisors and 
councillors 
The inference here is that the role of management and stakeholders in the 
governance function will be improved if its importance and power are linked 
primarily to the level of knowledge and skills and not so much their position in an 
organisation. However, if managers are responsible for balancing stakeholders’ 
interests it seems reasonable to assume that they must maintain influential and 
powerful roles in the organisation albeit within an ethical framework or coded 
guidelines. 
 
 
                                                     
3 Many governance guidelines and codes seek to institute independent leadership by recommending a clear division 
of responsibilities between Chairman and CEO. In this way, while the CEO can have a significant presence on the 
board, the non-executive directors will also have a formal independent leader to look to for authority on the 
board. Documents that place less emphasis on the need for a majority of independent directors seem to place 
more emphasis on the need for separating the role of Chairman and CEO. 
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Governance and Risk Management 
As MacAvoy and Millstein note a key element in securing the delivery of any 
governance programme is in the implementation of its strategy which needs to 
encompass an effective system of risk and stakeholder management (2003). As 
previously noted stakeholder management within the governance programme is by 
no means risk free. In the context of governance stakeholder management is about 
managing strategy and risk to achieve its governance objectives and benefits, (take 
in Figure 1).  The evaluation of the objectives and benefits of stakeholder input has 
an important ethics component (McManus, 2006). As Saner (2002) points out the 
use of stakeholder input in the governance decision-making process is not always 
straightforward because of two intrinsic issues (or dilemmas). If for example the 
advice from external stakeholders must be followed then they, arguably, may have 
too much power and may undermine democracy; and if the advice from external 
stakeholders may be ignored, how do you keep them motivated and how do you 
assure a just and defensible process? At the same time, there exists a clear need 
and desire to communicate important coming issues to stakeholders (Clarkson, 
1995). Communication binds stakeholders together for a specific period of time and 
during this time each person will be operating under a legal and ethical framework. 
As with most ethical issues, legality is considered to be a relevant issue and, in 
some instances, a measuring stick for what is considered to be ethical. Although 
ethics and legality are two separate issues, it is almost impossible to talk about one 
without the other.  Organizations and their managers have few options when it 
comes to deciding what is legal or what is not. With governance structures codes of 
ethics are more frequently being introduced to encompass the legal and social 
responsibilities of employees and other stakeholder groups. Ethic codes and 
guidelines reduce risk and protect managers and others from themselves, as well as 
from those who, they perceive, abuse the power of their position.  
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Figure 1 Governance and Stakeholder Framework 
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Governance and the Managerial Interface 
It is clear from Cadbury (1992), and Turnbull (1999) that industry and commerce is 
not always benevolent, and regulation can be an effective way to serve societal 
objectives MacAvoy and Millstein (2003). Regulating industry and commerce 
however, can be challenging and can have unintended consequences, which may be 
troublesome to society as the problem of regulation, is intended to prevent 
corporate misdemeanors. The underlying proposition in governance is that we share 
enough common values and owners and managers can agree on what are good 
governance procedures and drive changes in the governance process. As we have 
witnessed in practice, however, only dramatic failures such as Enron provide the 
basis for change, and this basis is known to be poor. The model defined in Figure 1 
suggests governance places considerable accountability on owners, managers and 
other stakeholders to make adjustments to their way of conducting business and 
applying measures of governance in synchronization with the organizations 
objectives. In making business decisions and adjustments to governance measures 
owners, managers and stakeholders need to consider the implications of their 
actions (McManus 2004). 
Governance decisions and all subsequent actions lie with the board and its 
management representatives and when standards, procedures, and expectations 
are not well established, owners and managers may not safely delegate their 
authority or expect stakeholders to be led or well served. According to (Floyd & 
McManus, 2004) managers often fail to recognise the importance of meeting 
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stakeholder expectations and many fail in offering ethical and governance 
leadership. Evidence would suggest (Cadbury, 1987, Bennis, 1989, Blanchard, 1989, 
Fulton, 1998, & McManus, 2004) that being an ethical person and making sound 
ethical decisions is enough; furthermore, some assume that good managers are by 
definition ethical leaders.  This does not necessarily mean the leader is a real 
moral or spiritual leader in a sense he or she commits no misdemeanour, but 
someone who can perhaps hold the leash on subordinates who might put their 
morality to their business transactions. Fulton states that the dilemma we all face 
every day, having to choose between action that benefits our own self-interest, 
and action that addresses our obligation to one another: our self-interest, including 
the need to profit from our dealings with others, versus the “moral” perspective, 
the social contract that binds us to others (Fulton, 1998). In essence the manager 
as a moral person is characterised in terms of individual traits; as a moral manager, 
he is thought of as conveying an ethics message that others take notice of in their 
views and behaviours. The basis of ethical leadership is being an ethical person. 
Stakeholders must think of you as having certain traits, engaging in certain kinds of 
behaviours, and making decisions based upon ethical principles. Moreover, this 
ethical self must be authentic. From a governance perspective ethical traits 
relating to trust include: moral order, integrity, honesty, fairness, and fulfilment of 
obligations. While these traits are clearly important, behaviours are equally 
important. Behaviours include: doing the right thing, showing concern for people 
and treating people right being open and communicative, and demonstrating 
morality in one's personal life.  In the decision-making role, managers should have 
a set of ethical values and principles; they should aim to be unbiased and 
reasonable (Hawley & White, 1996).  In terms of governance a manager’s decision 
should look beyond the balance sheet; the ‘moral person’ represents the essence of 
the ethical manager. Research by Atherton and McManus (2004) highlight the need 
for owners, managers and stakeholders to recognize the importance of proactively 
putting ethics at the forefront of their governance agenda. Mangers need to make 
the ethical dimension of their leadership explicit and salient to their subordinates.  
The ethical manager achieves by serving as a visible and vocal role model for 
ethical conduct and ethical management can be achieved using a reward system 
holding all accountable to ethical governance standards. 
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Conclusion 
Research shows that we need to further develop the governance model. What is 
needed to address the issues in this paper is a renewed attention to the research 
and study of governance and control; that is the ways in which this control affects, 
and is affected by, stakeholder relations; the power and behaviour of the firm elite 
and the nature of business political activity, including analysis of how such activity 
relates to the character of governance relationships between owners, managers 
and stakeholders. 
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